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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CYNTHIA DAHL, widow of
Steven B. Dahl, deceased
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case-No. 860319

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, REVLON
SERVICE, INC., and/or LIBERTY
MUTUAL and/or DEFAULT
INDEMNITY FUND,

Category No. 6

Defendants/Respondents
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS REVLON SERVICE INC.,
AND/OR LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
The sole issue to be decided on appeal is whether
there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to
sustain the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the
appellant is not entitled to dependency benefits under Utah
Workmen's Compensation Law because she was not a dependent of
the deceased at the time of his death.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Steven B. Dahl, an employee of respondent Revlon
Service, Inc., died in an airplane crash at the Dallas/Fort
Worth Airport on August 2, 1985, while in the course of his
employment.

At the time of his death, Mr. Dahl and his wife,

the appellant herein, were not living together and they were in
the process of obtaining a divorce.

On September 3, 1985, one

month after Mr. Dahl's death, the Commission issued a Death
Benefits Order requiring respondents Revlon Service, Inc.,
and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, to pay into the
Default Indemnity Fund statutory death benefits in the amount
of $30,000.00.

Said defendants were also ordered to pay the

statutory funeral allowance of $1,800.00.

Pursuant to this

Order, respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company paid the
aforementioned amounts to the Default Indemnity Fund and to the
executor of the estate of the deceased.
On December 12, 1985, appellant, Cynthia Dahl, filed
a Claim for Dependent's Benefits with the Commission.

A

hearing on the appellant's application was held on March 12,
1986, before Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen.

On

March 17, 1986, Judge Allen issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, denying the appellant's claim
and reaffirming the Commission's prior order of September 3rd.
Thereafter, the applicant filed a Motion for Review with the
Commission.

After considering the applicant's motion, the

Commission issued a memorandum opinion affirming the Order of
the Administrative Law Judge.

This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Appellant Cynthia Dahl and the deceased,

Steven Bradley Dahl, were married on October 22, 1978 in
Colorado.

(R. at 31)
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2.

At the time of her marriage to Mr. Dahl,

appellant was employed by Frontier Airlines as a flight
attendant and she has continued to work for Frontier up through
the present time.
3.

(R. at 31-32)
Mr. Dahl obtained employment with Revlon

Service, Inc., shortly after their marriage and in September,
1979, he and appellant moved to Utah due to the demands of
their various employments.
4.

(R. at 32)

After moving to Utah, appellant and Mr. Dahl

purchased a home in Sandy where they resided together until
November 1984.
5.

(R. at 32, 38)
On February 6, 1984, Mr. Dahl suffered a

heart attack which left him hospitalized for approximately one
month.

(R. at 35-3 6)
6.

Following his heart attack, appellant

testified that the relationship between herself and Mr. Dahl
changed.

Mr. Dahl spent more and more of his time working and

eventually he and the appellant "just stopped communicating."
(R. at 36)
7.

In November of 1984, appellant voluntarily

left Mr. Dahl and the family home in Sandy and moved into a
townhouse with a girlfriend in Aurora, Colorado.
8.

(R. at 37-38)

Although the appellant testified this

separation was only temporary,
Divorce in January, 1985.

Mr. Dahl filed a Complaint for

(R. at 38-39)

3

9.

Furthermore, the appellant continued to

reside in Colorado up to the time of Mr. Dahl's death in August
of 1985, some ten months after she first left the family home.
10.

During the year appellant lived apart from

Mr. Dahl, her salary for nine months of work was approximately
$20,000.00.

(R. at 106)
11.

While living in Colorado, the appellant

received no direct monetary support from her husband.

(R. at

59.)
12.

In fact, appellant sent $200.00 per month to

Mr. Dahl for three months immediately following her move to
Colorado.

(R. at 63)
13.

After appellant discontinued sending money to

Mr. Dahl, neither party made any payments to the other up to
the time of Mr. Dahl's death.
14.

(R. at 63.)

Subsequent to the filing of Mr. Dahl's

petition for divorce, appellant retained Paul Liapis as legal
counsel to represent her in the divorce proceedings. Mr.
Liapis prepared a Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking
temporary support from Mr. Dahl in the amount of $750.00 per
month.

This motion was never heard, however, as the parties

agreed prior to the hearing that if Mr. Dahl would maintain the
mortgage payments on the house as well as the other joint debts
of the parties during the pendency of the divorce proceedings,
the motion would be dropped.

(R. at 66-67; 144-148)
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15.

This agreement, however, did not obligate Mr.

Dahl to pay any debts other than those on which he was already
legally obligated.
16.

(R. at 80)

A short time after the aforementioned

agreement was reached, Mr. Liapis received a telephone call
from appellant wherein she told him that she and Mr. Dahl were
attempting to work out a settlement between themselves. Mr.
Liapis subsequently prepared a Stipulation of Property
Settlement Agreement and Consent to Default (hereinafter
Property Settlement) in accordance with instructions given to
him by the appellant.
17.

(R. at 72-74)

Under the terms of the Property Settlement

prepared at her direction, appellant unquestionably waived her
right to receive alimony from Mr. Dahl.
18.

(R. at 80-81 & 160)

A Property Settlement and Separation

Agreement (hereinafter "Separation Agreement11) was also
prepared by Mr. Green, counsel for Mr. Dahl.
19.

(R. at 165-172)

The agreement prepared by Mr. Green was

voluntarily signed by the appellant in front of a notary public
on July 23, 1985.
20.

(R. at 41, 172)
Under the terms of the Separation Agreement

signed by appellant, she also waived her right to receive
alimony from Mr. Dahl.
21.

(R. at 166)

Both the Property Settlement and the

Separation Agreement provided that Mr. Dahl would retain sole
custody and possession of the family home and that he would be
responsible for payment of the outstanding mortgage

5

obligation.

The agreements differed, however, in that the

Property Settlement required the home to be sold as soon as
possible after the divorce with the equity then being divided
equally between them, whereas the Separation Agreement allowed
Mr. Dahl to keep the home and pay appelTant in cash for her
share of the equity.
22.

(R. at 159, 166.)

On August 2, 1985, Mr. Dahl Was killed in the

crash of an airliner on which he was a passenger at the
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in Irving, Texas.

(R.

at 5)
23.

At the time of Mr. Dahl's death, no final

decree of divorce had been entered by the District Court.

(R.

at 49)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah Workmen's Compensation Law, when the
spouse of an employee killed during the scope and course of
his/her employment is not living with the deceased at the time
of death, the issue of dependency becomes a question of fact to
be decided by the trier-of-fact.

In the instant case, the

appellant was not living with her estranged husband at the time
he died.

Thus, the question of her dependency becomes a

question of fact for the Commission.

The findings of fact of

the Commission cannot be overturned on appeal unless they are
unsupported by the evidence.

In the instant case, the finding

that appellant was not dependent on her husband at the time of
his death is supported by substantial competent evidence.
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Therefore, the order of the Commission should not be disturbed
on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CANNOT
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL SO LONG AS -THEY ARE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Utah Code Ann., §35-1-84 (1953 as amended)
provides that when reviewing an order of the Industrial
Commission, the Supreme Court may affirm or set aside the award
only upon the following grounds:
(1)

That the Commission acted without or
in excess of its powers; and

(2)

That the findings of fact do not
support the award.

The standard of review identified in §35-1-84 is
a very limited one as is evidenced by the decision in Blaine
v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985).
Therein, the court stated:
This Court has interpreted the foregoing
statutory standard [§35-1-84] on
numerous occasions and has concluded that
the Commission's findings are not to be
displaced in the absence of a showing that
they are arbitrary and capricious.
(Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 1086.

Findings of the Commission are deemed to be

arbitrary and capricious only where there is no substantial
competent evidence to support them.

This fact is illustrated

by the decision in Vause v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d
217, 407 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1965), where the following comment
was made:
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This Court cannot properly reverse the
Commission and compel an award unless there
is credible evidence without substantial
contradiction which points so clearly and
persuasively m plaintiff's favor that
failure to so find would justify the
conclusion that the Commission acted
capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably
in disregarding or refusing to believe the
evidence.
See also State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah,, 685
P2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1984) ("Our standard of review in
Industrial Commission cases is stringent. . . .In reviewing
questions of fact we defer to a great degree to the
Commission's findings and reverse only where they are without
foundation in the evidence.").

In the case at bar, there is

ample competent evidence in the record to support the findings
and order of the Commission.

Thus, the decision of the

Commission must be affirmed.
POINT II.
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DEPENDENT ON MR. DAHL
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH IS
A QUESTION OF FACT
The two statutes governing dependent's death benefits
under Utah Workmen's Compensation law are Utah Code
Annotated §35-1-68(2) and §35-1-71 (1986 Cumm.
Supp.).

The relevant portion of the former,

§35-1-68(2)(b)(iv), reads as follows:
For purposes of any dependency
determination, a surviving spouse of a
deceased employee shall be conclusively
presumed to be wholly dependent for a
six-year period from the date of death of
the employee.
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The scope of the conclusive presumption identified in the
above-cited statutory provision is limited, however, by
§35-1-71(2) which further states:
For purposes of payments to be made under
subsection (2)(b)(i) of section 35-1-68, a
surviving husband or wife shall be presumed
to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with
whom he or she lived at the time of the
employee's death.
In all other cases, the question of
dependency, in whole or in part, shall be
determined in accordance with the facts in
each particular case existing at the time
of the injury or death of such employee
. . .. (Emphasis added.)
The requirement that the surviving spouse be living with the
deceased at the time of death in order for the conclusive
presumption of dependency in §35-1-68 to apply has been
recognized both by the appellant in her brief (See Appellant's
brief p. 13) and by this Court in the case of Tuom v. Duane
Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah 1984). *1

Because

the appellant admittedly was not living with Mr. Dahl at the
time of his death, she is not entitled to §35-1-68's
conclusive presumption of dependency and her status as a

*1 According to Donnita's argument, §35-1-68(2)(b)(iv)
should be read as meaning that any surviving spouse is
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a period of
six years. However, that interpretation would cause this
provision to conflict with the §35-1-71 direction that for
purposes of death benefits under §35-1-68(2)(b)(i) a
surviving spouse is presumed wholly dependent upon the decedent
only if said spouse is living with the decedent at the time
of death. These two sections were considered together and
altered by the same amendatory legislation in 1979. They
should be interpreted to avoid inconsistencies if possible.
(Citation omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
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dependent thus becomes a question of fact to be determined by
the Commission as the trier-of-fact.

The role of the

Commission as the fact finder in dependency proceedings was
established early on in the case of Rigby v. Industrial
Comm!n, 286 P. 628 (Utah 1930).

In Rigby, the court stated:

Whether one person is dependent upon
another within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is primarily a question of
fact. It is the exclusive province of the
Industrial Commission to determine the
facts and to draw legitimate inferences
therefrom. It is also, in the first
instance, the province of the Commission to
determine from such facts and inferences
whether dependency does or does not
exist. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 63 0.

In the instant case, there are numerous facts in

the record to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding
that the appellant was not dependent on Mr. Dahl at the time of
his death on August 2, 1985.

Therefore, the ruling of the

Administrative Law Judge as adopted by the Commission should
not be disturbed.

POINT III
THE APPELLANT DID NOT MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF IN
ESTABLISHING ACTUAL DEPENDENCY ON THE DECEASED AT
THE TIME OF HIS DEATH ON AUGUST 2, 1985.
A. In Order To Establish Actual Dependency,
Appellant Must Show She Was Receiving Support In The
Form Of Financial Or Other Comparable Assistance From
The Deceased At The Time Of His Death
In Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d
897, 898-899 (Utah 1975) this court stated:
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The case law of this state has consistently
limited dependency to those fact situations
wherein the deceased had contributed
financial assistance or comparable
assistance such as growing food, which was
used in supporting the dependant.
(Footnote omitted).
The court also cited with approval the following
definition of a dependent found in Park Utah Consolidated
Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 481, 488 36 P.2d
979 (1934):
A dependent is one who looks to another for
support, and the true criterion is whether
one has a reasonable expectation of
continuing or future support—to receive
such contributions as are necessary and
needed to maintain him in his accustomed
station in life.
In the instant case, the evidence adduced at the time of the
hearing clearly established that the appellant was not
receiving financial or other comparable assistance from the
deceased at the time of his death.

Furthermore, the appellant

had no reasonable expectation of future support from Mr. Dahl
as the evidence indicated she intended to waive all rights to
alimony following termination of the marriage.
does not meet the definition of a dependent.

Thus, appellant

Not only had she

moved out of the family home and established a new place of
residence in Aurora, Colorado approximately ten months prior to
Mr. Dahl's death, but she also maintained all of her own living
expenses throughout her separation from the deceased.
fact is evidenced by her own testimony as follows:
A.
had
not
for

Two months I sent him money. Until I
talked with Paul, and told him I could
live in Denver, plus give Steven money
the bills. Then that's when we started
11

This

talking about the Stipulation Agreement and
stuff.
Q.

How much money did you send him?

A.

Oh, I think it was like $200.00 a month.

Q.

And that went on for—

A.

I only did that for three months.

Q.

For three months?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you pay him any other money?

A.

No.

Q.

And he didn't pay you any other money?

A.

No.

(R. at 63) .
It should be noted that appellant's legal counsel at
one point prepared an "Order To Show Cause" seeking temporary
support on her behalf during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings.

The order was never heard by the court, however,

as appellant agreed to drop its pursuit when Mr. Dahl agreed to
assume the mortgage payments on the home together with some
other joint debt obligations the couple had incurred during
their marriage.
Appellant claims the very preparation of the
temporary support order establishes her dependency on the
decedent.

However, the Administrative Law Judge specifically

noted in his Findings of Fact that he had some "serious doubts
about the truthfulness and accuracy of that document," after
reviewing it in light of the appellant's testimony at the time
of the hearing.

(R. at 206).

He further stated that it was
12

his opinion the Motion and the expenses outlined therein were
111

padded1 for the purpose of leverage during the [divorce]

litigation."

(R. at 206).

This conclusion of the

Administrative Law Judge is reasonable in view of the fact that
after appellant dropped her attempt to obtain temporary support
from Mr. Dahl, she continued to maintain herself and a separate
residence in Denver without any apparent difficulty and without
any other attempts to obtain funds from the deceased.
His conclusion is also supported by appellant's
waiver of alimony in both the Property Settlement prepared by
her own counsel at her request and pursuant to her instructions
and the Separation Agreement prepared by counsel for Mr. Dahl.
In both agreements the appellant forever waived her right to
receive alimony in very clear and concise terms.

For example,

in the agreement prepared by Mr. Liapis it states:

"Neither

Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be required to pay any alimony
whatsoever to the other, and the same shall be forever
barred."

(See attached Exhibit "A")

It should be noted that

although Mr. Liapis testified he was concerned about whether
the agreement he prepared was a correct reflection of all of
his client's terms, there was no doubt in his mind that
appellant had instructed him to include the waiver of alimony
provision.

(See R. at 80-81).

The waiver provision

contained in the agreement prepared by Mr. Green was also very
clear:

"Neither party is entitled to alimony and none should

be awarded and the rights thereto should be entirely set
aside."

(See attached Exhibit "B")
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This particular agreement

was voluntarily signed by the appellant in front of a notary
public on July 25, 1985, just a few days prior to the
decedent's death.

In the case of Tuom v. Duane Hall

Trucking, cited earlier, this court noted:

[A]ny substantial period of time without
support may signal a cessation of support,
even if there is no other evidence of that
intent. Similarly, the failure of a
previously dependent person to pursue
practical remedies to encourage or legal
remedies to compel continued support may
signal acquiescence in the end of a state
of total or partial dependency.
Tuom at 1203.
Appellant also contends that consideration of the
waiver of alimony provision in the agreement she signed as
evidence of her lack of dependency constitutes error because
the district court hearing the divorce proceedings had not
approved it prior to Mr. Dahl's death.

Whether or not the

waiver provision was enforceable at the time Mr. Dahl died,
however, the Administrative Law Judge is entitled to consider
it in relation to all of the other evidence for purposes of
establishing the intent and expectations of the parties.

In

the instant case, a final hearing in the divorce proceedings
was scheduled on August 7, 1985. Appellant's signing of the
Separation Agreement shortly prior to that time reasonably
suggests that she was not expecting the receipt of support from
Mr. Dahl after their marriage was terminated.

That such

inferences may be drawn by the hearing officer is supported by
the decision in Penn Sanitation Co. v. Hoskins, 10 Pa.Cmwlth.
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528, 312 A.2d 458 (1973).

In Penn the claimant and the

decedent were separated at the time of the decedentfs death.
The Pennsylvania Workman's Compensation Act provided that no
compensation would be paid to a widow unless she was living
with her husband at the time of his death or was "then actually
dependent upon him and receiving from him a substantial portion
of her support."

The court found that the claimant was not

dependent upon the decedent for support and thus not entitled
to benefits because of a support order that the wife had sought
and obtained just one month prior to her husband's death.

The

order in question sought support only for the two children of
the claimant and deceased.

The claimant had obtained a prior

order after an earlier separation which also sought support for
herself.

The court held:
The second support order provided only for
the support of the 'two children'. This
order, as in Hendricks v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 150 Pa.Super. 257, 27 A.2d 264
(1942), was limited to the children and did
not include support of the wife. The
order was acquiesced in by the wife,
(citation omitted) and such acquiescence
bars recovery, Hendricks, supra.
(Emphasis in original).

Id. at 459. Just as the failure of the claimant in Penn to
seek support for herself barred her recovery of dependency
benefits, the failure of the appellant herein to seek temporary
support and/or alimony on her own behalf is evidence of her
acquiescence in Mr. Dahl's failure to support her and of her
ability to maintain herself without such support.
B. The Mere Existence Of Joint Financial Obligations
Does Not Establish Dependency Where The Parties Are

15

Voluntarily Separated And Each Is Maintaining His or
Her Own Living Expenses Prior To Death.
Appellant contends on appeal that the finding she was
not dependent on her husband at the time of his death was error
as a matter of law because the Administrative Law Judge did not
interpret the word "support" to include "payments related to
debt assumption."

(Appellant's brief, p.12)' It is the

defendant's position, however, that the mere existence of joint
financial obligations is not sufficient to establish dependency
in cases where the parties are voluntarily separated and each
is maintaining his or her own living expenses prior to the
death at issue.

This position is supported by case law in

other jurisdictions addressing the same argument appellant has
raised . For example, in the case of City of Aurora v.
Claimant in Death of Corr, 689 P.2d 659 (Colorado Appellate
1984), the Colorado Court of Appeals stated:
We also find as a matter of law that the
mere existence of joint obligations after
separation and filing of a dissolution of
marriage petition does not, under
§8-50-101, indicate partial dependency
between an estranged couple voluntarily
living apart and supporting themselves by
their individual earnings.
Colorado Statute §8-50-101 provided in pertinent part as
follows:
[T]he following described persons shall be
presumed to be wholly dependent (however,
such presumption may be rebutted by
competent evidence):
(a) widow or widower, unless it is
shown that she or he was voluntarily
separated and living apart from the
spouse at the time of the injury or
death or was not dependent in whole or
16

in part on the deceased for support
• • . .

Id, at 661. Admittedly the governing Colorado statute in
City of Aurora is not exactly like the Utah statutes at issue
herein.

It does, however, make dependency a question of fact

as in the case at bar.

Furthermore, the court's finding that

the mere existence of joint obligations does not establish
dependency was made under facts very similar to those at issue
herein.

In City of Aurora, the claimant's wife suffered a

fatal employment related accident on June 27, 1981. Just
twelve days before her death, the claimant had filed a petition
for divorce which the decedent had signed as a co-petitioner.
A hearing on the claimant's application for benefits
established that the parties had been separated since May 30,
1981, with the claimant living in the marital home and the
decedent maintaining her own apartment.

It was also shown that

the parties earned similar salaries, that each had been paying
his or her own living expenses, "and that they were sharing or
planning to share responsibility for the payment of joint
obligations which were incurred during their marriage."
Although the evidence adduced in the instant case indicated Mr.
Dahl's agreement to assume full responsibility for the parties'
joint obligations during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings, it also established that they intended to share
responsibility for their joint obligations following
dissolution of the marriage with the exception of the family
home.

The mortgage payments on the home, on the other hand,

were to made solely by Mr. Dahl so long as the home remained
17

unsold as he was the party residing in the home and obtaining
the benefit of residency in the home.

Also, as in City of

Aurora, during their separation, with the exception of the
three $200.00 payments appellant sent to the deceased, each
party paid their own living expenses without anv aid from the
other.

And finally, although the appellant's -salary did not

match the decedent's at the time of his death, 'her income was
substantial.

In fact, the appellant testified that her actual

income in 1985, the year the decedent died, was approximately
$2 0,000.00 and this amount represented only a nine month work
year as she did not work for the three months following Mr.
Dahl's death.
The argument raised by appellant that dependency may
be established by the payment by one spouse of joint
obligations was also rejected by the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania in S and S Associates, Inc. v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board (Hochman), 465 A.2d 57 (Pa.Cmwlth.
1983) . In S and S, the claimant and her husband had been
separated for approximately two-and-a-half years prior to his
death.

He had been living in the residence owned jointly by

himself and the claimant.

Both the claimant and the deceased

were employed and the claimant received no support payments
from her husband during their separation.

Furthermore, shortly

before his death the deceased had initiated divorce proceedings
against the claimant.

During the period of the claimant's and

the deceased's separation, the deceased made the payments on
the mortgage on the jointly-owned house as well as payments on
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a note which his estranged wife had co-signed.

The Court

rejected the claimant's position that the payment by the
deceased of these joint obligations constituted support and
stated:
The referee found and the Board affirmed
that Sylvia Hochman was dependent on her
estranged husband for support within the
purview of Section 3 07 because he continued
to make payments on debts for which Sylvia
Hochman was jointly liable. We
disagree. One of the debts was a mortgage
on the property which Sylvia Hochman had
left and in which Seymour Hochman continued
to live;
the other was a loan for Seymour
Hochman1s business for which the house
stood as collateral. The benefit of
continued payment on both these debts would
enure primarily to Seymour Hochman. In
light of his failure to provide any support
payments to his wife and his removal of his
wife and daughter from his medical
insurance plan, as well as the institution
of divorce proceedings for desertion, we
cannot characterize the payment on debts to
sustain his business and his home as
support for his estranged wife. (Emphasis
added).
Id. at 58-59.

In view of the decision of the above cited

courts and in view of the fact appellant had maintained her own
living quarters and had paid her own living expenses without
any financial assistance from the deceased for nearly ten
months prior to his death, defendants contend that the payment
of the mortgage on the couple's home during the time Mr. Dahl
was living in the home and accruing the benefit of residency in
the home can not be construed as support of the appellant
sufficient to establish her dependency on the deceased on
August 2, 1985, as a matter of law.

The fact appellant chose

to move back into the family residence after Mr. Dahl's death
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is irrelevant to the issue of her dependency at the time of his
death.

When Mr. Dahl died, appellant was not living in the

family home, neither was she obligated to make the mortgage
payments on the home for such had been assumed by her husband.
Although the mortgage payments are now being made by her,
appellant has also received the added value of Mr. Dahl's share
of the equity in the home.

Furthermore, since she is no longer

living in Colorado, she no longer has the living expenses
associated with maintaining that household.

In view of these

facts and the others previously discussed, appellant failed to
establish her dependency on the decedent at the time of his
death.

CONCLUSION
Under Utah workmenf s compensation law where a
claimant is not living with his or her spouse at the time of
death, the issue of dependency becomes a question of fact.

The

Commission, as the trier-of-fact, is entitled to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh all of the evidence
in reaching a conclusion.

In the instant case, the

Administrative Law Judge specifically questioned the
credibility of some of the evidence presented at the time of
the hearing.

Furthermore,

after reviewing all of the evidence

before him, he determined that appellant was not, in fact,
dependent on the deceased, Steven B. Dahl, at the time of his
death on August 2, 1985.

The Administrative Law Judge's order

is supported by substantial competent evidence and it is in
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accordance with the provisions of Utah law.

Therefore, the

order of the Commission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this ^=^t# day of January, 1987
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
St NELSON

:CIJXEL E. DYER
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY
Attorneys for Respondents
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
on this ^yt//1

day of January, 1987, to the following counsel

of record:

FRANK J. GUSTIN
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
48 Post Office Place
Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
SUZAN PIXTON, ADMINISTRATOR
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND
Utah Industrial Commission
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Telephone: (801) 530-6989
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ADDENDUM

PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Defendant
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 53 2-69 96
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL,

STIPULATION OF PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND CONSENT TO DEFAULT
.Civil No. D 85-38

Defendant•

Judge Frederick
ooOoo

Plaintiff, STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL, and Defendant, CYNTHIA ZOE
DAHL, by and through their respective attorneys, Frederick N.
Green and Paul H. Liapis, hereby stipulate and agree to the
follov/ing Settlement Agreement with regard to the distribution of
real and personal property, the payment of debts accumulated by
the parties, payment of support and other related matters, and,
subject to approval by the Court of this Agreement and its
incorporation into a Decree of Divorce,
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from

the Plaintiff subject to the terms of this Stipulation of
Property Settlement Agreement as set forth below, and this'

WDUSTRI/AL O C T '
EXHIBIT NO.

-,,-.,

Agreement is executed in the contemplation of continuing and
permanent separation and divorce.
2.

Plaintiff hereby agrees and consents that his default

may be entered herein, that the matter mav be heard by the Court
on its merits at any time and without further notice to him, that
this Agreement is a complete settlement of all rights either
party may have in the other's property, whether presently
existing or hereafter acquired, that Plaintiff consents that his
Complaint for Divorce can be withdrawn and that Defendant may
pursue this matter on her Counterclaim.
Plaintiff further understands that the Court may, for good
cause shown, waive the 90-day waiting period as provided by §
30-3-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953)f as well as the three-month waiting
period as provided by § 30-3-7 Utah Code Ann. (1953), and
Plaintiff further understands that the Court may hold an
immediate hearing upon the Counterclaim and enter judgment
against the Plaintiff without further notice and may allow the
Decree to become final and absolute upon signing and entry, and
Plaintiff further expressly consents and, in fact, believes it to
be in the best interests of the parties that both periods be
waived and the divorce become final upon signing and entry.
3.

During the course of the marriage, Plaintiff and

Defendant have acquired certain items of real and personal
property and have incurred certain debts and obligations, all of
which are part of this Stipulation, and the parties acknowledge
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that the division as set forth herein is satisfactory between
them and that, in accordance with this Agreement, each party
shall own, free and clear of any claim of the other, the items of
personal property and distribution as set forth herein and that
each party shall be free to dispose of all items, of property
which may hereafter be acquired by him or her as fully and
effectively as if he or she were unmarried.
In connection with the foregoing provision, it is agreed
that the following property shall be divided between the parties
as follows:
A.

The home of the parties located at 11551 South

Hidden Valley Boulevard, Sandy, Utah, shall be sold for the
highest attainable market price and at the earliest possible
time, with all mortgages and encumbrances and the commission
and closing costs to be paid from the gross proceeds
received therefrom and with the balance divided equally
between the parties.

Plaintiff shall have the use and

possession of this home until such sale and shall assume and
pay the mortgage payments thereon until the home is sold.
Both parties shall cooperate in their efforts at achieving a
sale in this matter, and Defendant shall be kept advised as
to all offers, open houses and other efforts toward the sale
of this home.
B.

Plaintiff shall be awarded as his sole and

separate property his bank accounts; the furniture,
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furnishings and appliances presently in his possession and
under his control, including, but not limited to, the
washer, dryer, refrigerator, snow blower, lawn mower and
one-half of the silver wedding gifts (with the exception of
the antiques given to the parties by Defendant's father
which should be returned to her); his retirement account
with Revlon; and his personal clothing, effects and
belongings.
C.

Defendant shall be awarded as her sole and

separate property her bank accounts; the furniture,
furnishings and appliances presently in her possession and
under her control, including, but not limited to, the
microwave oven, Hoover vacuum cleaner and one-half of the
silver wedding gifts; all items of antiques given to
Defendant by her father and family; her retirement account
with Frontier Airlines, the 1984 Pontiac Fiero; the two U.S.
Savings Bonds in her name; and her personal effects,
clothing, jewelry and belongings.
D.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be required

to pay any alimony whatsoever to the other, and the same
shall be forever barred,
E.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be awarded

their separate life insurance policies on their individual
lives and their own health, accident and hospitalization
insurance coverage to do with as they choose.
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F.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each assume and pay

any debts and obligations they have incurred in their own
names since the separation of the parties on December 20,
1984, and hold the other party harmless therefrom,
G.

The parties acknowledge that they, owe the

following debts and obligations:

Advanced Mortgage - first

mortgage on home; Frontier Credit Union - Defendant's car;
First Security VISA; Plaintiff's American Express card;
Defendant's American Express card; Nordstroms; Weinstocks;
ZCMI; Sears; Penneys; Mervyns; The Bon; Castletons; GECC;
Frontier Credit Union VISA; and Dr, Bruce Brewer>1.

It is agreed by and between the parties that

the Plaintiff will assume and pay the first mortgage
payment on the home; his American Express card; General
Electric Credit Corporation; one-half of the First
Security VISA; one-half of the accounts with
Nordstroms, Weinstocks, ZCMI, Sears, Penneysf Mervyns,
Castletons and Dr. Bruce Brewer,
2.

Defendant shall assume and pay the obligation

to Frontier Credit Union on her automobile; her
American Express card; one-half of the First Security
VISA; one-half of the credit cards to Nordstroms,
Weinstocks, ZCMI, Sears, Penneys, Mervyns and
Castletons; her account with The Bon; her VISA account

5
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with Frontier Credit Union; and one-half of Dr. Bruce
Brewer's bill.
3.

Those debts to be shared jointly by the

parties shall initially be assumed and paid for by the
Plaintiff until the home is sold', at which time, he
will be reimbursed for one-half of those amounts he can
prove he has paid to the creditors representing
Defendant's share of those obligations. The balance of
her share of the proceeds shall be given to her
following the accounting thereon.
H.

The parties shall each pay their own attorney's

fees in connection with this action.
4.

Each party hereby specifically agrees to cooperate with

the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes in
titles to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change the
names and responsibilities for payment upon the charge accounts
and other debts divided herein, and to cooperate in each and
every other way necessary or proper to insure that the Agreement
entered into is carried out in every detail.
5.

In the event either party to this Agreement defaults in

his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall be
liable to the other party for all reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred in the enforcement of the obligations
created by this Agreement.
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6,

The parties agree that this Agreement is a complete

settlement of all rights either party may have in the other's
property, whether presently existing or hereafter acquired.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunder set their
hands this

day of

:

, 1985„*

STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL
Plaintiff

FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL
Defendant

PAUL H. LIAPIS
Attorney for Defendant
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Appeared before me this

day of April, 1985, the

above-named Plaintiff, STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL, who, after being duly
sworn on oath and after reading the provisions and terms of the
foregoing Stipulation, acknowledged to me that the same was
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understood and signed as Plaintiff's own free act and desire,
without fraud, duress, or undue influence.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Appeared before me this

day of

, 1985, the

above-named Defendant, CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL, who, after being duly
sworn on oath and after reading the provisions and terms of the
foregoing Stipulation, acknowledged to me that the same was
understood and signed as Defendant's own free act and desire,
without fraud, duress, or undue influence.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:
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GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN ( 1 2 4 0 )
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
900 Newhouse B u i l d i n g
10 Exchange P l a c e
/ S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
( 8 0 1 ) 363-5650
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE- OF UTAH
STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL,
Plaintiff,

)
)

PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND
SEPARATION AGREEMENT

VS.

Civil NO. D-85-38
CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL,

)
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

)

The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, and has been such for a period in excess of three months
prior to the filing of the Complaint.
2.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife

having been married on the 22nd day of October, 1978, in Aurora,
Colorado,
3.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage

and none are expected.
4.

During the course of the marriage,, the Defendant has

treated Plaintiff cruelly causina him great mental distress and
making it totally impossible to continue the marriage
Page -1-
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relationship.
5.

Neither party is entitled to alimony and none should

be awarded and the rights thereto should be entirely set aside.
6.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acguired an interest in a home and real property located at the
street address commonly referred to as 11551 South Hidden Valley
Boulevard/ in Salt Lake County/ State of Utah.

The parties agree

that the home and real property has a current eguity of
$23/214.00.

The parties agree that each party should be awarded

an interest in the home and real property egual to one-half the
eguity of the parties therein after deducting the reasonable
expenses of sale and closing which the parties agree shall be
egual to seven percent (7%) of the value of the homef which/ it
is agreed by the parties, it egual to $95/500.00.

Plaintiff will

pay Defendant for her share of the equity in the home and real
property of the parties, in full, on or before the 1st day of
August/ 1985.

The Defendant shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in

favor of the Plaintiff and shall be granted a recordable lien
representing her interest in the eguity of the parties.

The

Plaintiff is awarded the sole custody and possession of the home
and real property of the parties subject to Defendant's interest
as set forth herein.

Plaintiff shall bear the sole and separate

responsibility for the home mortgage installments.
7. The parties agree to pay, in egual amounts/ the
following debts and obligations/ in the amounts as they appeared
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as of the 20th day of December/ 1984, such* that each parties'
share will be approximately $3,358.64: v j A ^ O
a.

VISA - Rocky Mountain

b.

Fashion Bar

c.

Nordstroms

d.

J.C. Penney

e.

Weinstocks

f.

BON

g.

Sears

h.

Bohm Allen

i.

K.G. Mens Store

j.

VISA - Salt Lake City, Utah.

k.

ZCMI

1.

Bank Loan

m.

Mervyns

8.

In the event the Defendnt does not pay the

obligations and debts as set forth herein- then the amount that
Defendant agreed to pay, and did not pay will be deducted from
her share of the home equity prior to the payment thereof to
Defendant.
9.

The Defendant agrees to return all credit cards in

her possession for which the Plaintiff may be jointly liable.
10.

The parties agree and stipulate that as of December

20, 1984, the home payments were three months in arrears.

The

parties agree to divide equally the liability for those three
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months home payments and, in the event that one party or the
other has paid those payments, then the other party will
reimburse him or her for 50% of that amount.

In the event that

Plaintiff pays those three months home payments and the Defendant
fails to reimburse him for one-half of that amount, then that
amount will be deducted from the share of .Defendant's home equity
of the parties.
11.

The parties agree to hold the other harmless as to

the debts and obligations assumed by that party in this
agreement.
12.

During the course of the marriage the parties have

acquired certin items of personal property which should be
divided between the parties as follows:
TO THE PLAINTIFF:
a.

All personal property brought into the

marriage.
b.

All gifts from the Defendant.

c.

Major household appliances including

washer/dryer and refrigerator.
d.

Fifty percent of the marriage gifts.

e.

Plaintiff's personal effects and clothing.

f.

The personal property presently located at the

home of the parties subject to those items designated to
belong to the Defendant hereafter.
TO THE DEFENDANT:

Pane -4-

a.

All personal orooertv brouaht into the* marriage

by Defendant.
b.

All gifts from the Plaintiff.

c.

Fifty percent of the marriage gifts.

d.

Defendant's personal property and clothing.

e.

Housekeeping items such as pots, pans, towels,

and sheets, etc., be agreement of the parties.
f.

The Defendant's gifts from her father including

antiques presently in the posnefjnLon of t-.ho PJ/ilntirr.
13.

In addition to the personal property referred to

above, the Defendant shall be awarded the interest of the parties
in the 1984 Pontiac Fiero in possession of the Defendant subject
to any indebtedness thereon which Defendant shall pay and hold
the Plaintiff harmless thereon.
14.

The parties should be awarded his or her own

separate savings accounts, checking accounts, money market
accounts, credit union accounts and the like, if any, without any
claim by the other.
15.

Each party should be awarded his or her own

retirement, pension, or profit sharing plan, if any, free of any
claim by the other.
16.

Each party will pay his or her own attorney's fees

incurred in the bringing and prosectution of this matter or its
defense.
17.

This Agreement shall not be deemed a condonation by
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either party of the act or acts claimed by either party to have
caused the differences leading to the parties' separation.
18.

No modification or waiver of any of the terms of

this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the
party to be charged.

No waiver of any breach or default

hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or
default of the same or similar nature.
19.

Each party hereby specifically agrees to cooperate

with the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes
in title to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change
the names and responsibilities for payment on the charge accounts
and other way necessary to be proper to insure that the Agreement
entered into is carried out in every detail.
20.

In the event ether party to this Agreement defaults

in his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall
be liable to the other for all reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of the obligations
created by this Agreement.
21.

The parties agree that this Agreement is a complete

settlement of all rights either party may have in the other's
property whether presently existing or hereafter aquired.
22.

The above-named Defendant specifically stipulates

and acknowledges as follows:
a.

That the Defendant agrees to allow her default

to be entered on Plaintiff's Complaint subject to the
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terms and provisions of this Settlement Agreement;
b.

That said Defendant understands that the court

may, for good cause shown, waive the ninety-daty waiting
period provided by Section 30-3-18 Utah Code Annotated
(1953) and immediately hold a hearing upon the Complaint
and enter Judgment against said Defendant without further
notice and that said Defendnt consents to the same and,
in fact believes it to be in the best interest of the
parties to waive said period and requests the Court to
waive said period;
c.

That said Defendant further understands that the

Court may, for good cause shown, waive the three months
waiting period providing by Section 30-3-7 Utah Code
Annotated (1953) and order that the Decree may become
absolute upon entry and that, believing it to be in the
best interests of both parties, said Defendant further
requests the Court to waive the same;
d.

That Frederick N. Green, attorney for Plaintiff,

represents only the Plaintiff in this matter and does not
represent the Defendant for any purpose at any time; and
e.

That the above acknowledgements and stipulations

are dependent upon and made in contemplation of the
parties agreeing to and executing this Settlemebnt
Agreement and the same being approved by the Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunder set their

hand on this

DATED this

2.^ day of

, 1985,

Uiif

-^S~ day of

<C?/A

, 1985.

GREEN & BERRY

tEDERICK N. GREEN
;torney for Plaintiff

(EN BRADLEY
Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On the j?S7 k
day of Q ,
, 1985, before me, the
undersigned officer, personally7appeared Steven Bradley Dahl who
is known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed
the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness whereof, I have Jiereunto set my hand and
official seal this .zr/ft day of Q^£^,
, 1985.
l^'-Lst-^L/

My commission expires:
^ / c 7,

Notary -Public n
Residing a 12 ^/^j^^cc c

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS

PAUL LIAPIS
Attorney for Defendant

CYNTHIA ,ZOE DAHL
STATE OF UTAH
Page -8-
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) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On the J'ira
day of J ^ J L ^
, 1985, before me, the
undersigned officer, personally appeared Cynthia Zoe Dahl who is
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed
the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal this ^^J)
day of TJJJji^
/ 1985.

0
My commission expires:

)tary Public
Residing at:

JK38
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STATEOFUTAH
) m
OOUNTY OF SALT LAK* ) "
I. T M UMO€WMCM€0, OLERK Of TVI€ DOTPWOT
OOUWT OF ©ALT L A * * COUNTY, UTAH, BO UEREEY
camm THAT THE AK*£XED AND *OREGOJNG %
\A imM AND PJLL COPY Of AW CWGINAL DOCUumr^ OH FitB m &*Y OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK.
W m ^ S S teY HAND AND SEAL Of 8AiO COURT
THIS r?
DAY Of
> ^ X - ^ ^ ie
^
BY

:/ * ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^

DEPUTY
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